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Abstract It has been suggested that actors co-represent a
shared task context when they perform a task in a joint
fashion. The present study examined the possibility of co-
representation in joint task switching, in which two actors
shared two tasks that switched randomly across trials.
Experiment 1 showed that when an actor performed the
tasks individually, switch costs were obtained if the actors
responded on the previous trial (go trial), but not if they did
not respond (no-go trial). When two actors performed the
tasks jointly, switch costs were obtained if the actor
responded on the previous trial (actor-repeat trials) but not
if the co-actor responded (actor-switch trials). In Experi-
ment 2, a single actor performed both tasks of the joint
condition to test whether the findings of Experiment 1 were
due to the use of different response sets by the two actors.
Switch costs were obtained for both repetitions and alter-
nations of the response set, which rules out this possibility.
Taken together, our findings provided little support for the
idea that actors co-represent the task sets of their co-actors.
Introduction
There are numerous occasions in everyday activities for
which two or more individuals need to perform a task
cooperatively to achieve a common goal. In such situa-
tions, the labor required to perform the shared task must be
divided between co-acting individuals. For instance, a
person may drive a car while another navigates the driver
in an unfamiliar neighborhood. The driver is concerned
with the operations of the vehicle and the traffic condition,
whereas the navigator is concerned with the current loca-
tion of the vehicle and the selection of the correct route to
the destination. Given that each actor possesses only an
incomplete picture of the whole task context, how can they
achieve a common goal that requires information from both
actors? Traditional approaches suggest that the actions of
one actor can become stimuli to trigger the actions of the
other, and vice versa, until the shared goal is achieved.
However, a recent approach has suggested a more far-
reaching possibility that co-actors do not only represent the
shared goal, but also co-represent the entire task that
includes both the actor’s own context and the co-actor’s
context (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; Knoblich,
Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). By doing so, each co-actor
would represent a given task in the same fashion, which
implies that each co-actor would represent the task-related
stimulus–response mappings not only for his or her own
part of the task, but also for the part of the co-acting
other’s.
Previous research has provided evidence for the
assumption that jointly performing a task leads to the
representation of at least some aspects of a co-actor’s
contributions to the task. The most systematic findings
pertaining to this issue have been obtained by means of the
joint Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003). In a standard,
individual Simon task, participants press a left or right key
in response to non-spatial features of a stimulus that is
presented randomly to the left or right of some reference
point (e.g., the fixation mark on the monitor). Even though
stimulus location is irrelevant to selecting the correct
responses, responses are faster and more accurate if the
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stimulus location coincides with the response location than
if it does not, which is termed the Simon effect (Lu &
Proctor, 1995; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 2012). In the joint
version of the task, the two responses are divided among
two co-acting participants, such that one actor responds to
one of the relevant stimulus features (e.g., red stimuli) and
the other actor responds to the other stimulus features
(green stimuli). Note that this renders the task essentially a
go/no-go task, which does not yield a Simon effect in the
absence of a co-actor (Hommel, 1996). In the presence of a
co-actor who operates the other key, a reliable Simon effect
is observed (Sebanz et al., 2003), which is thus termed the
joint Simon effect. Given that the Simon effect is attributed
to response-selection processes (Lu & Proctor, 1995;
Hommel, 2011), the joint Simon effect demonstrates that
participants take into consideration the active contributions
of their co-actor when selecting their responses.
Research has begun to determine in more detail which
aspects of the co-actor’s contributions to the task are
considered in the process of response selection. Earlier
approaches assumed that the impact of the co-actor’s
contributions on response selection is automatic (Sebanz
et al., 2003; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005) and only
occurs with human co-actors (e.g., Tsai, Kuo, Hung &
Tzeng, 2008), which has been taken to demonstrate the
‘‘social nature of perception and action’’ (Knoblich &
Sebanz, 2006). More recent studies have shown that the
joint Simon effect is sensitive to the relationship between
the two co-actors, so that its presence or size depends on
whether this relationship is positive or negative (Hommel,
Colzato & van den Wildenberg, 2009), competitive or
cooperative (Ruys & Aarts, 2010), or more or less
empathic (Ford & Aberdein, 2015), and whether the co-
actors are perceived to belong to the same social group
(Aquino et al., 2015; Constantini & Ferri, 2013; Iani,
Anelli, Nicoletti, Arcuri, & Rubichi, 2011; McClung,
Jentzsch & Reicher, 2013). These observations suggest that
the joint Simon effect relies on particular social factors,
although they do not necessarily support a strong claim that
all perception–action processes are inevitably social in
nature (see Dolk et al., 2014, for a review). Moreover, a
reliable joint Simon effect is obtained not only with human
or anthropomorphized non-human co-actors (Müller et al.,
2011), but also with a salient inanimate object such as a
Japanese waving cat or a ticking metronome that is pre-
sented in the place of a co-actor (Dolk, Hommal, Colzato,
Prinz & Liepelt, 2011).
Although these findings do not warrant a strong claim
that co-actors fully share their entire task experience, the
findings would arguably allow for a more parsimonious
interpretation of task sharing that an actor represents the
actions of, or even the stimulus–response relationships
followed by, a co-actor. It is possible that participants
represent not only the stimuli that they need to respond to
(which in some sense already implies some knowledge
about the stimuli they need to ignore) and the responses
that they need to carry out, but also the activities that their
co-actor carries out. This might be because it allows the
better monitoring of turn taking in a joint task (Liefooghe,
2016; Wenke et al., 2011), or because the presence of
another event, such as the co-actor’s activities, reintroduces
an event representation against which the instructed event
(one’s own action) needs to be selected (Dolk et al., 2014).
It is even possible that people represent the associations
between stimuli and responses for both one’s own and the
other’s actions, as this would allow one to predict actions
from stimuli. Such associations are commonly assumed to
constitute the basis of task sets, which would suggest that
people do represent at least the basic ingredients of the task
set of a co-actor (Knoblich et al., 2011).
The present study aimed to disentangle these two pos-
sibilities by means of a joint task-switching setting. In
regular, individual task-switching settings, participants
alternate between two or more tasks that differ with respect
to the assignment of responses to stimuli. Responses are
commonly faster if the task on the current trial is the same
as the preceding trial (repeat trial) than if it is different
(switch trial)—the so-called switch cost (for reviews, see
Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Ver-
bruggen, 2010). Switch costs are likely to reflect a larger
number of processes, including the extra time needed to
reconfigure the task set on switch trials (Meiran, 1996),
interference from no longer relevant but still lingering
previous task sets (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), priming
in case of a repeated task cue (Logan & Bundesen, 2003),
and the residual switch costs that remain even after a long
preparation time (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Consider how
switch costs might be affected by having tasks being shared
by two co-actors. The most obvious prediction from a
shared task set account (Knoblich et al., 2011) would be
that switch costs should be the same irrespective of whe-
ther the previous trial was carried out by the participant or
a co-actor. Previous studies do not provide unequivocal
evidence for this possibility.
To date, three studies have looked into joint task
switching (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016;
Wenke et al., 2011). Two of these studies had two actors
perform two different tasks with the relevant actor being
cued randomly from trial to trial (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016;
Liefooghe, 2016). Whereas this design implies confound-
ing between task switching and turn taking (i.e., switching
the actor implied switching the task, and vice versa), the
idea was that switch trials should produce worse perfor-
mance than repeat trials only if the participant actively
represents the co-actor’s task. Thus, the presence of switch
costs after co-actor’s trials would indicate shared task
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representations. Dudarev and Hassin (2016) obtained sig-
nificant switch costs in such a joint condition, but not in a
control condition for which individual participants carried
out the same go/no-go task without a co-actor. The
researchers also found no switch costs in another control
condition for which both actors worked on the same task.
The results were taken to argue against the possibility that
turn taking itself could have been responsible for the
measured switch costs. Unfortunately, however, the same
task versus different task manipulation was carried out
between groups, which might have affected the represen-
tation of the other agent. A co-actor who performs the same
task as oneself may be perceived as more similar to oneself
(Hommel et al., 2009) than a co-actor who performs a
different task. Perceived self–other similarity has been
demonstrated to facilitate ‘‘feature migration’’ between self
and other (Ma, Sellaro, Lippelt & Hommel, 2016), in the
sense that features that actually relate to the other are
perceived as part of oneself. Thus, it may be that switching
is more demanding between actors that are perceived to be
more different, producing switch costs in the different task
conditions but not in the same task condition. This expla-
nation would not require the assumption of task sharing. It
may also be that participants monitor the stimulus–re-
sponse contingencies of the co-actor’s trials (Liefooghe,
2016), which would necessarily lead to more violations of
the rules the participant is storing for his or her own per-
formance if the co-actor’s task is different, especially when
the same stimuli are mapped to different responses for two
co-actors (as was the case in Dudarev and Hassin’s study).
Such violations might have increased the dissimilarities
between the co-actors, making it more difficult to perform
the task after the co-actor’s trial.
A very similar study was carried out by Liefooghe
(2016), who also had co-actors carry out different tasks. The
study aimed to separate three different components of switch
costs: (a) the efficiency of task preparation, as measured by
the reduction of switch costs if more preparation time is
available; (b) the interference from the previous task set, as
measured by the reduction of switch costs if the interval
between the previous response and the next task cue
increases; and (c) the residual switch costs that remain after
the longest preparation time. Interestingly, neither task
preparation nor interference from the previous task was
sensitive to task/actor switches, which according to the
author rules out that participants truly represented the co-
actor’s task set. In contrast, residual switch costs were
increased with task/actor switches, an effect that Liefooghe
attributed to the requirement to identify the relevant actor in
this condition. This interpretation would also account for the
findings of Dudarev and Hassin (2016), as would the
aforementioned possibility that exposure to different stim-
ulus–response contingencies increases cognitive conflict.
Whereas the studies of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and
Liefooghe (2016) can be taken to investigate the effects of
actor switching, Wenke et al. (2011, Experiment 2) discuss
an unpublished study that assessed the impact of task
switching more directly. This study sought to separate the
effects of actor switching in task switching by having two
actors perform the same two tasks (e.g., color discrimina-
tion and shape discrimination). A task and an actor were
randomly cued on each trial, so that only one actor per-
formed on a given trial, just as in the studies of Dudarev
and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016). This joint go/no-
go (i.e., actor no switch and switch) condition was com-
pared to an individual go/no-go condition, in which a
single actor performed the same task with the actor cue
serving a go/no-go cue (i.e., ‘respond’ vs. ‘not respond’).
There were switch costs after go trials and no switch costs
after no-go trials in the individual condition, which repli-
cated a standard observation (e.g., Schuch & Koch, 2003).
The crucial question was whether the same pattern could be
observed in the joint condition. If the actor repeats (i.e., in
go trials), one would expect standard switch costs, as the
participant would need to reconfigure his or her own cog-
nitive system. More diagnostic data came from the actor-
switch trials, as these followed no-go trials. If participants
represent the co-actor’s task set just like their own (Kno-
blich et al., 2011), one would expect switch costs of the
same size as in trials following go trials, so that switching
costs should be independent from actor switch. If they do
not represent the co-actor’s task set, however, one would
expect no switch costs just as in the individual condition.
Wenke et al. (2011) report that the same pattern was found
in individual and joint conditions, with significant switch
costs for actor repetitions but not for actor switches.
While this would arguably be rather strong evidence
against the shared representation of task sets, the respective
study has not yet been published and the brief description
presented in Wenke et al.’s (2011) review article does not
allow for strong and far-reaching claims. To test whether
the necessary evidence could be provided, Experiment 1 of
the present study conceptually replicated and extended the
experiments discussed by Wenke and colleagues, which
allowed us to avoid the problems associated with the two
actor-switching studies of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and
Liefooghe (2016). Note that in Experiment 1, actor
switching was de-confounded from task switching, but was
still confounded with switching of response set because
two co-actors used different sets of response keys. Exper-
iment 2 examined the effect of switching response sets on
task switch costs by having a single participant perform
both tasks of the joint condition using the two response sets
that were assigned to two co-actors in Experiment 1. If the
same task set is used to perform the same task with dif-
ferent response sets, switch costs should be obtained
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regardless of whether the response set is switched. Such
outcomes would reinforce the interpretation of Experiment
1, especially if switch costs are found to depend on actor
switching.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, pairs of individuals performed a cued
task-switching paradigm, in which a task cue unpredictably
signaled one of two tasks (color or shape task) on each
trial. The actors used two different sets of two response
keys each to respond to the target stimuli. In the joint
condition, one of the actors was also cued at target onset,
and only the cued actor responded while the other did not
perform. In the individual condition, the procedure was
identical, except that one of the actors did not perform
throughout an entire block, so no one responded on trials
for which the active actor was not cued. It was expected
that in the individual condition, switch costs should be
obtained on trials that followed go trials, but not on trials
that followed no-go trials (Schuch & Koch, 2003). If task
sets are co-represented by the co-acting participants in the
joint condition, there should be switch costs on trials that
followed the co-actor’s trial as well as on trials that fol-
lowed the actor’s own trial. If not, the outcome should be
comparable for joint and individual conditions, with switch
costs being present in trials following go trials but not in
trials following no-go trials.
Note that Wenke et al.’s conclusion relied on the null
effect including only 16 participants in each of the two
versions of the experiment. We used a larger sample size
(N = 56) to increase the statistical power1 so that small
effects could be detected. Moreover, none of the previous
studies included multiple task cues for each task, so the
contribution of cue priming was not dissociated from that
of task switching (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). By including
multiple task cues, we could examine whether the actors
pay attention to some aspects of the co-actor’s task context
if not to the entire context, as recently suggested in a dif-
ferent joint task setting (Janczyk, Welsh, & Dolk, 2016).
Thus, we included three types of transitions, cue-repeat
trial (both the task cue and the task repeated), cue-switch
trial (the task cue switched, but the task repeated), and task-
switch trial (both the task cue and the task switched). Each
transition occurred in one-third of the trials. The difference
between cue-repeat and cue-switch trials reflected a cue-
switch cost, and the difference between cue-switch and
task-switch trials reflected a task-switch cost. We expected
no task-switch cost on trials following no-go trials in the
individual and joint conditions, as in Wenke et al.’s report.
It was still possible to obtain cue-switch costs in the joint
condition, because the task cue appeared before the actor
cue, so both actors would have to encode the task cue on
every trial. If so, the encoded task cue would remain in
short-term memory and facilitate cue encoding on the next
trial (Logan & Bundesen, 2003), facilitating responding
when the same task cue repeats.
Method
Participants
Fifty-six undergraduate students at Edge Hill University
participated in the present study (49 females, 7 males;
mean age 18.79, SD 1.41, range 18–24). They were
recruited from an introductory psychology module and
received experimental credits toward the module or paid £3
for participation. All reported having normal color vision
and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. They
were naı̈ve as to the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus and stimuli
The apparatus consisted of a personal computer and a 23-in
widescreen monitor. Stimuli were green and red squares
(4.8 cm in side) and diamonds (the squares tilted 45),
which appeared at the center of the screen. The task cues
were ‘‘COLOUR’’ and ‘‘HUE’’ for the color task, and
‘‘SHAPE’’ and ‘‘FORM’’ for the shape task. The task cues
were presented in the Courier New font at 36-pt. They
appeared 6.8 cm above the screen center. The actor cue
was the letter ‘‘A’’ (to indicate the actor on the left) and
‘‘B’’ (to indicate the actor on the right). The cue was
superimposed on diamonds and squares, in the Arial font at
40-pt in white; as the background was also white, it appears
as if there was a letter-shaped hole in the stimulus.
Responses were registered by pressing keys on a
QWERTY desktop keyboard.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two computer labs with
24 seats arranged in four rows of six computers each. The
distance between two adjacent computers was about
160 cm. There were at most three pairs in each row; each
pair of participants was seated in front of a computer
1 We computed post hoc power for the experiments reported by
Wenke et al. (2011), assuming a small effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.15)
with a 2 (Task Transition: repeat vs. switch) 9 2 (Condition: joint vs.
individual) 9 2 (Previous Trial: go vs. no-go) repeated-measures
design at the alpha level of 0.05, which resulted in the power of 0.340.
With the sample size of 56, the estimated power increased to 0.925,
and with the 3 9 2 9 2 design that we actually used in Experiment 1,
it went up to 0.979.
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monitor and at every other computer to avoid cluttering
between pairs. Participants from different seminar groups
were assigned to pairs randomly by the experimenter. Each
pair of participant read on-screen instructions, which
emphasized both the speed and accuracy of the response.
Participants who sat on the left side placed their left and
right index fingers on the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys, respectively;
those who sat on the right side placed their left and right
index fingers on the ‘1’ and ‘3’ keys on the numerical
keypad on the right side of the keyboard. For both partic-
ipants, the ‘z’ and ‘1’ keys were called the left response,
and the ‘c’ and ‘3’ keys were the right response. Each
participant was instructed to press the left key for one color
and the right key for the other color for the color task, and
the left key or one shape and the right key or the other
shape for the shape task; the mappings between the keys
and the colors and shapes were randomly determined for
each pair.
Each participant performed two joint blocks, for which
one participant responded to a subset of stimuli and another
to another subset of stimuli, and one individual block, for
which one participant responded to stimuli and another
participant remained silent. Thus, there were two joint
blocks and two individual blocks for each pair. Each block
consisted of 120 test trials, and there was a block of 16
practice trials before the first joint blocks and before each
of the two individual blocks (one for each actor). For some
pairs, two joint blocks were administered first and then two
individual blocks; for other pairs, two individual blocks
were administered first and then two joint blocks. The order
of the joint and individual blocks was determined randomly
for each pair. Within the individual blocks, the order of the
actor performing the block was also determined randomly.
In the joint block, each trial started with a task cue that
stayed on the screen for 450 ms, followed by a 50-ms blank
screen. The imperative stimulus (colored square or dia-
mond) appeared for 2000 ms or until a response was made,
along with the actor cue that was superimposed on the
imperative stimulus. If the correct response was made, a
blank display replaced the stimulus and lasted for 1000 ms;
otherwise, an error message was presented for 1000 ms.
The message was ‘‘Error!’’ for an incorrect response and
‘‘Faster!’’ for no response. If a wrong actor responded, the
message was ‘‘Not your turn!’’ The next trial started with
another task cue. Response time (RT) was measured as the
interval between the onset of the imperative stimulus and a
depression of a response key.
The individual block was essentially the same, but
participants were required to respond only when the actor
cue indicated their trials (go trials) but withhold responding
when the actor cue indicated their co-actor’s trials (no-go
trials). If no response was made on a go trial, the error
message was ‘‘Respond!’’ If a response was made on a no-
go trial, the error message was ‘‘Don’t respond!’’ There
was a 2000-ms window to respond on each trial.
Design
The experiment involved two conditions, joint and indi-
vidual conditions, which defined the factor Task Condition.
Both conditions consisted of three types of task sequences
(cue repeat, cue switch, and task switch), which defined the
factor Task Sequence. Cue repeat referred to the condition
for which the same task cue occurred on two successive
trials (e.g., ‘‘SHAPE’’ on trial N, and ‘‘SHAPE’’ again on
trial N ? 1); cue switch referred to the condition for which
the two different task cues assigned to the same task
occurred on two successive trials (e.g., ‘‘SHAPE’’ on trial
N, and ‘‘FORM’’ on trial N ? 1); and task switch referred
to the condition for which two different task cues assigned
to different tasks occurred on two successive trials (e.g.,
‘‘SHAPE’’ on trial N, and ‘‘HUE’’ on trial N ? 1). Trials
were determined randomly on each trial, so that there was
an equal probability of 33 % for each sequence type. In the
individual condition, previous trials could be go or no-go
trials; in the joint condition, previous trials could be per-
formed by the same actor as the current trial (actor repeat)
or by a different actor (actor switch). The factor Previous
Trial was defined as to whether the same actor responded to
stimuli on the previous trial (go trials in the individual
condition and actor-repeat trials in the joint condition) or
did not (no-go trials in the individual condition and actor-
switch trials in the joint condition). Previous Trial and Task
Sequence were manipulated orthogonally.
Results
Trials were excluded from analyses if RT was less than
200 ms, if no response was made within the 2000-ms
window, or if a wrong actor responded (4.44 % of all tri-
als). Among the remaining trials, the overall error rate was
(25.31 %), which is higher than typical task-switching
experiments with single actors. This is reasonable given the
complexity of the task. Also, participants did not receive
extensive practice with the task before the test trials, which
might have contributed to increasing the overall error rates.
Due to the high error rates, trials that followed an error trial
were not excluded to retain as many trials as possible (the
data were also analyzed after excluding trials following an
error trial, but the results are consistent with those reported
below). One female participant was excluded from the
analysis due to an empty case in one of the conditions.
Mean RTs and percentages of error trials (PE) were com-
puted for each participant and submitted to 2 (Task Con-
dition: joint vs. individual) 9 3 (Task Sequence: task
1170 Psychological Research (2017) 81:1166–1177
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switch vs. cue switch vs. cue repeat) 9 2 (Previous Trial)
ANOVAs. All factors were within-subject variables. The
ANOVA results are summarized in Table 1. RT and PE are
shown in Fig. 1.
Mean response times
Responses were generally faster for the joint condition
(M = 788 ms) than for the individual condition
(M = 833 ms), as indicated by a significant main effect of
Task Condition. A significant main effect of Previous Trial
revealed that responses were also faster if the previous trial
was a go trial (M = 795 ms) or the actor’s own trial
(M = 753 ms) than if the previous trial was a no-go trial
(M = 872 ms) or the co-actor’s trial (M = 823 ms). A
main effect of Task Sequence was also significant, and the
factor interacted with Previous Trial. Post hoc tests (Bon-
ferroni adjusted2) compared RTs for cue-repeat, cue-
switch, and task-switch trials to clarify the interaction.
When the same actor responded on the previous trial, RT
was shorter for cue-repeat trials (M = 732 ms) than for
cue-switch trials (M = 784 ms, p = 0.004) and for task-
switch trials (M = 806 ms, p\ 0.001), whereas the latter
two did not differ (p = 0.390). However, when the same
actor did not respond on the previous trial (i.e., when the
previous trial was no-go in the individual condition or
when it was the co-actor’s trial in the joint condition), no
switch costs emerged (Ms = 852 ms for cue repeat,
843 ms for cue switch, and 847 ms for task switch; all
ps = 1).
Although the three-way interaction among Previous
Trial, Task Sequence, and Task Condition was far from
significant, we also compared the three trial types in terms
of previous trial separately for the individual and joint
conditions for clarity. In the individual condition, when the
previous trial was a go trial, RT was shorter for cue-repeat
trials (M = 742 ms) than for cue-switch trials
(M = 819 ms; p = 0.038) and for task-switch trials
(M = 823 ms; p = 0.002), whereas the latter did not differ
(p = 1). When the previous trial was a no-go trial, there
were no differences among the three task sequences
(Ms = 883 ms, 857, ms, 876 ms, for cue-repeat, cue-
switch, and task-switch trials; all ps = 1). In the joint
condition, when the previous trial was the actor’s own trial,
RT was shorter for cue-repeat trials (M = 722 ms) than
task-switch trials (M = 788 ms; p\ 0.001) and tended to
be shorter for cue-repeat trials than for cue-switch trials
(M = 749 ms; p = 0.073) and for cue-switch trials than
for task-switch trials (p = 0.071). Most importantly, when
the previous trial was the co-actor’s trial, RT did not differ
for these trials (Ms = 821, 830, and 818 ms, for cue-re-
peat, cue-switch, and task-switch trials, respectively; all
ps = 1).
Percentages of error trials
The PE results were consistent with the RT results, except
that a main effect of Task Condition was not significant. A
significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that PE
was smaller when the same actor responded on the previ-
ous trial (M = 23.73 %) than when the actor did not
respond (M = 27.60 %). Task Sequence produced a main
effect, and it also interacted with Previous Trial. When the
same actor responded on the previous trial, task switch
produced a larger PE (M = 30.40 %, p\ 0.001) than did
cue repeat (M = 20.16 %, p\ 0.001) or cue switch
(M = 20.64 %), whereas the latter two did not differ
(p = 1). When the actor did not respond on the previous
trial, there were no differences among the three sequences
(Ms = 26.72 % for cue repeat, 27.00 % for cue switch, and
29.08 % for task switch; all ps[ 0.4). As in RT, Task
Condition did not modulate these outcomes.
Discussion
As expected, switch costs were obtained in the individual
condition when the preceding trial was a go trial, but not
when it was a no-go trial. Importantly, switch costs were
also obtained in the joint condition when the preceding trial
Table 1 ANOVA results in Experiment 1
Factors df MSE F p gp
2
Response time
Task condition (TC) 1, 54 80,193.05 4.29 0.043 0.074
Previous trial (PT) 1, 54 10,378.33 43.8 <0.001 0.448
Task sequence (TS) 2, 108 12,456.51 5.28 0.006 0.089
TC 9 PT 1, 54 9779.98 \1 0.611 0.005
TC 9 TS 2, 108 12,255.84 \1 0.940 0.001
PT 9 TS 2, 108 8840.93 10.58 <0.001 0.164
TC 9 PT 9 TS 2, 108 11,723.51 2.3 0.105 0.041
Percentage of error trials
TC 1, 54 548.72 \1 0.679 0.003
PT 1, 54 109.30 22.60 <0.001 0.295
TS 2, 108 166.57 16.47 <0.001 0.234
TC 9 PT 1, 54 145.18 1.05 0.310 0.019
TC 9 TS 2, 108 117.26 \1 0.918 0.002
PT 9 TS 2, 108 112.29 9.89 <0.001 0.155
TC 9 PT 9 TS 2, 108 148.02 \1 0.504 0.013
Bold represents a significant effect
2 To implement the Bonferroni correction, p values were multiplied
by the number of pairwise t tests, which is equivalent to dividing the
criterion p value (a) by the number of pairwise t tests.
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was the actor’s own trial (actor repeat), but not when it was
the co-actor’s trial (actor switch). Note that go/no-go sig-
nals appeared with the target after the presentation of a task
cue, so task preparation would have occurred on each trial,
but response selection might have been restricted to go
trials (Schuch & Koch, 2003). This is consistent with the
assumption that the actors in the present experiment did not
select a response on their co-actors’ trials as if these trials
were their own (Wenke et al., 2011), which is not consis-
tent with the idea that the task set of the co-actor was co-
represented (Knoblich et al., 2011). Furthermore, the
inclusion of multiple task cues for each task did not show
any evidence that task cue priming facilitated responding
after no-go or the co-actor’s trials. This is an interesting
outcome. Cue repetition is thought to allow the actors to
retain the previous task cue in short-term memory and
facilitate cue encoding on the current trial (Logan &
Bundesen, 2003). The task cue appeared before the actor
cue in the present experiment, so the actors would need to
encode the task cue on every trial. The lack of cue switch
costs after no-go trials indicates that the encoded task cue
was discarded from short-term memory during the co-
actor’s trial. One possibility is that the representation of the
given task cue was bound to either one’s own no-go
reaction (cf., Kühn & Brass, 2010) or to the other agent.
Repeating a cue could then have retrieved this (now mis-
leading) binding, which would be expected to create con-
flict (Hommel, 2004) and might have counteracted possible
priming benefits. In any case, this effect does not support
co-representation of co-actor’s task sets either.
It is also interesting to note that participants made rel-
atively fewer errors to interpret the actor cue (\5 %) and
the majority of errors was due to misapplications of wrong
stimulus–response mappings (*25 %). These outcomes
may reflect a hierarchical structure of cognitive processes,
whereby participants first determined whose turn it was and
subsequently selected an appropriate response to the target.
Experiment 2
Although the outcome of Experiment 1 is consistent with
those of the study discussed in Wenke et al.’s (2011)
review, one may wonder how the obtained switch costs
Fig. 1 Mean response times (RT) and percentages of error trials (PE) for the joint condition (a) and the individual condition (b) as a function of
task sequence and the previous trial in Experiment 1 (error bars represent one standard error of the mean)
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compare to standard switch costs obtained when a single
actor performs the same task condition without a co-actor.
We call this a full-task condition, following Liefooghe
(2016) who also compared actor switching with standard
individual task switching. Testing a full-task condition is
important, because a lack of switch costs in the joint
condition of Experiment 1 can be taken as evidence against
a strong shared task set, only if switch costs could be
obtained in the full-task condition. This is because of the
possibility that assigning different tasks to different hands
or response sets facilitates the cognitive separation and
discrimination between the two tasks, which in turn might
reduce or eliminate task switch costs (Jersild, 1927). Only
if this possibility can be excluded, can we confidently
conclude that the outcome of Experiment 1 provides
unequivocal evidence against task set sharing in this task
setting. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we went on to test
whether switch costs are obtained in a full-task condition: a
single actor used the two response sets that were distributed
between two actors in the joint condition of Experiment 1,
with one hand operating one response set and the other
hand operating the other response set. The actor cue used in
Experiment 1 was used to cue a response set (i.e., hand) to
be used on a given trial. Because a single actor represented
both task contexts, we expected that switch costs should be
obtained regardless of whether the response set was swit-
ched across successive trials.
Method
Participants
Twenty-six participants were recruited from the Edge Hill
University community (19 females, 7 males; mean age
21.73, SD 6.57, range 18–50). They received experimental
credits toward their psychology modules or paid £3 for
participation. All reported having normal color vision and
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. They were
naı̈ve as to the purpose of the experiment.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
The apparatus and stimuli were identical with those used in
Experiment 1. The only difference was that participants
performed all trials alone without a co-actor. The experi-
ment was also conducted individually in a smaller experi-
mental room. Participants placed their left middle and
index fingers on the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys and their right index
and middle fingers on the ‘1’ and ‘3’ keys on the numeric
keypad, respectively. The letter that appeared within the
target stimulus cued which hand to use, such that ‘‘A’’
indicated the left hand and ‘‘B’’ indicated the right hand.
Each participant performed two blocks of the go/no-go
condition and two blocks of the full-task blocks. The go/
no-go condition was exactly the same as the individual
condition in Experiment 1, except that there was no co-
actor sitting next to them; participants always used the left
hand on one block and the right hand on the other block.
The full-task condition was the same as the joint condition
in Experiment 1, except that the actor cue now cued the
hand to be used on each trial (‘‘A’’ indicated the left hand,
and ‘‘B’’ indicated the right hand). Two blocks were
identical for the full-task condition. The present experi-
ment followed closely the procedure of Experiment 1 in
other respects.
Design
The experiment involved two conditions, full-task and go/
no-go conditions, which were analogous to the joint and
individual conditions in Experiment 1, respectively, and
defined the factor Task Condition. Both conditions con-
sisted of three types of task sequences (cue repeat, cue
switch, and task switch), which defined the factor Task
Sequence. In the go/no-go condition, previous trials could
be a go or no-go trial; in the full-task condition, previous
trials could be performed with the same hand as the current
trial (hand repeat) or by a different hand (hand switch).
The factor Previous Trial was defined as to whether par-
ticipants used the same hand to respond to stimuli on the
previous trial (go trials in the go/no-go condition and hand
repeat trials in the full-task condition) or they did not (no-
go trials in the go/no-go condition and hand switch trials in
the full-task condition).
Results
Trials were excluded in the same manner as in Experiment
1 (4.18 % of all trials). As in Experiment 1, the overall
error rate was high (33.55 %). Trials that followed an error
trial were excluded in the analysis, but the results were
consistent when those trials were included. RT and PE
were computed for each participant and submitted to 2
(Task Condition: full-task vs. go/no-go) 9 3 (Task
Sequence: task switch vs. cue switch vs. cue repeat) 9 2
(Previous Trial) ANOVAs. The ANOVA results are sum-
marized in Table 2. RT and PE are shown in Fig. 2.
Mean response times
The significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that
responses were faster when participants used the same
response set on the previous trial (Ms = 843 ms and
841 ms for the go/no-go and full-task conditions,
Psychological Research (2017) 81:1166–1177 1173
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respectively) than when they did not (Ms = 945 ms and
921 ms for the go/no-go and full-task conditions, respec-
tively). Responses also depended on Task Sequence, but
this effect was modulated by Previous Trial and Task
Condition. To clarify the three-way interaction, the effect
of Task Sequence was analyzed separately for the full-task
condition and the go/no-go condition. Multiple compar-
isons were Bonferroni corrected.
For the full-task condition, RT was slower for task-
switch trials (M = 902 ms) than for cue-switch trials
(M = 827 ms; p = 0.001) or for cue-repeat trials
(M = 793 ms; p\ 0.001) when the previous trial was
performed by the same hand, analogous to actor-repeat
trials in the joint condition of Experiment 1; there were no
differences between cue-repeat and cue-switch trials
(p = 0.109). When the previous trial was performed by the
different hand, RT was still longer for task-switch trials
(M = 964 ms) than for cue-switch trials (M = 901 ms;
p = 0.003) or cue-repeat trials (M = 897 ms; p = 0.004);
there were no differences between cue-repeat and cue-
switch trials (p = 1).
Table 2 ANOVA results in Experiment 2
Factors df MSE F p gp
2
Response time
Task condition (TC) 1, 25 81,374.85 \1 0.676 0.007
Previous trial (PT) 1, 25 14,310.02 45.39 <0.001 0.645
Task sequence (TS) 2, 50 6,751.92 21.72 <0.001 0.465
TC 9 PT 1, 25 7,016.36 1.35 0.257 0.051
TC 9 TS 2, 50 3,633.36 2.35 0.106 0.086
PT 9 TS 2, 50 4,929.93 8.97 <0.001 0.264
TC 9 PT 9 TS 2, 50 3,397.35 3.68 0.032 0.128
Percentage of error trials
TC 1, 25 420.34 1.80 0.192 0.067
PT 1, 25 150.26 8.52 0.007 0.254
TS 2, 50 94.58 12.51 <0.001 0.333
TC 9 PT 1, 25 100.21 1.84 0.187 0.069
TC 9 TS 2, 50 115.36 \1 0.925 0.003
PT 9 TS 2, 50 67.34 3.55 0.036 0.124
TC 9 PT 9 TS 2, 50 82.47 3.73 0.031 0.130
Bold represents a significant effect
Fig. 2 Mean response times (RT) and percentages of error trials (PE) for the full-task condition (a) and the go/no-go condition (b) as a function
of task sequence and the previous trial in Experiment 2 (error bars represent one standard errors of the mean)
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For the go/no-go condition, RT was longer for task-
switch trials (M = 909 ms) than for cue-switch trials
(M = 832 ms; p = 0.001) or cue-repeat trials
(M = 789 ms; p\ 0.001) when the previous trial was a go
trial; there was no difference between the latter two
(p = 0.225). When the previous trial was a no-go trial, no
difference emerged among task switch (M = 943 ms), cue
switch (M = 947 ms), and cue repeat (M = 947 ms; all
ps = 1). These outcomes are consistent with the individual
condition of Experiment 1.
Percentages of error trials
As in Experiment 1, the PE results were generally consistent
with the RT data. A significant main effect of Previous Trial
revealed that PE was lower when the previous trial required
the same hand response or when it was a go trial
(M = 22.76 %) than when the previous trial required a dif-
ferent hand or when it was a no-go trial (M = 26.81 %). Task
Sequence produced a main effect and interacted with Previ-
ous Trial. More importantly, the significant three-way inter-
action among Task Sequence, Previous Trial, and Task
Condition indicated that switch costs depended on the pre-
vious trial type, but differently for the full-task and go/no-go
conditions. To disentangle this interaction, post hoc tests
(Bonferroni corrected) were carried out to examine the effect
of Task Sequence separately for the two task conditions.
In the full-task condition, task switch produced a larger
PE (M = 31.15 %) than did cue repeat (M = 26.41 %,
p = 0.039) and cue switch (M = 25.23 %, p = 0.046)
when the previous trial required a different hand, whereas
the latter two did not differ (p = 1). Although the results
were similar when the previous trial required the same hand,
as task switch (M = 28.80 %) produced larger PE than did
cue repeat (M = 22.86 %) or cue switch (M = 23.60 %),
the differences were only marginal (ps = 0.09 and 0.10,
respectively). Thus, switch costs were more pronounced
when the hand switched across trials than when the same
hand repeated. In the go/no-go condition, task switch pro-
duced a larger PE (M = 27.67 %) than did cue repeat
(M = 15.30 %, p = 0.016) and cue switch (M = 15.30 %,
p = 0.001), whereas the latter two did not differ
(p = 0.802) when the previous trial was a go trial. When the
previous trial was a no-go trial, there were no significant
differences (Ms = 23.45 % for cue repeat, 27.52 % for cue
switch, and 27.09 % for task switch; all ps[ 0.5).
Discussion
Switch costs were obtained in the go/no-go condition when
previous trials were go trials, but not when they were no-go
trials, consistent with the individual condition of
Experiment 1. In the full-task condition, switch costs were
obtained in RT on hand-repeat trials for which participants
used the same response set (analogous to actor-repeat tri-
als) as well as on hand-switch trials for which participants
used different response sets (analogous to actor-switch
trials). The outcomes imply that the same task represen-
tation was used to perform trials even when the response
set differed between trials as long as the same actor per-
formed both trials. In this experiment, a single actor inte-
grated the two task contexts (i.e., two response sets) into a
single task representation that should be equivalent to co-
representation of the shared task contexts in the joint
condition. Thus, the present results, and their difference
with those in the joint condition of Experiment 1, suggest
that the lack of switch costs in Experiment 1 was not due to
the nature of the task condition (e.g., task complexity, task
discrimination, or response set discrimination). Instead,
these findings reinforce the conclusion that the lack of
switch costs in the joint condition of Experiment 1 implies
a lack of task set sharing. Interestingly, there were no cue
switch costs on hand-switch trials, indicating that the lack
of cue-switch costs in the joint condition of Experiment 1
(which may represent the binding of cues to either one’s
own no-reaction or to the other agent and/or his or her
response) was not unique to joint performance. It may be
that cue-repeat trials still involved switches of the actor- or
hand cue, so they were not purely cue-repeat trials as cue
encoding continues until the actor- or hand-cue encoding is
completed.
General discussion
Approaches to joint performance agree in assuming that
people take the activities of co-actors into account, but
there is also evidence that the resulting representations do
not capture all aspects of the joint task. The present study
sought to test whether people may represent not only the
stimuli that co-actors are facing (so as to allow for turn
taking; e.g., Wenke et al., 2011) and the actions that co-
actors execute (so as to allow for self–other action dis-
crimination; Dolk et al., 2014), but also entire task sets that
include stimulus–response relationships relevant only to
the co-actor (Knoblich et al., 2011). As we have argued,
previous investigations of actor switching (Dudarev &
Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016) are not sufficiently diag-
nostic because they are open to interpretations that do not
require the assumption of task set sharing. A more telling
design was discussed by Wenke et al. (2011, Experiment
2), which was taken from an unpublished study. We
therefore adopted the basic design from this latter study,
together with a manipulation of task cue repetition versus
switch to determine whether the basic findings could be
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confirmed in a well-powered study. Experiment 1 shows
that this was indeed the case: task switch costs were
obtained after go trials, but not after no-go trials, irre-
spective of whether a co-actor performed during the actor’s
no-go trials. Experiment 2 showed that reliable task switch
costs were obtained if the same participant operated on the
two response sets that were distributed across two partici-
pants in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that
the lack of reliable switch costs in Experiment 1 was due to
the fact that the two actors used different response sets.
Taken together, these findings question a strong claim of
task set sharing that ‘‘humans represent not only their own
tasks but also those of their partners and even those of
people who they do not need to coordinate with’’ (Knoblich
et al., 2011, p. 83).
A possible counterargument could be derived from a
recent discussion of the processes involved in no-go trials.
The lack of switch costs after no-go trials is commonly
thought to reflect the fact that task switching is complete
only after a response is selected and executed (Philipp,
Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, & Koch, 2007; Schuch & Koch,
2003; also see Rogers & Monsell, 1995). On go trials,
response-related processes complete the activation of the
relevant task set, and the activation survives until the next
trial where it can impair the performance if a different task
set is required to perform the trial. On no-go trials, how-
ever, response-related processes are not executed, so the
activation of the relevant task set is not sufficiently strong
to carry over to the next trial. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the fact that the elimination of switch costs is
associated with increases in RT on repeat trials rather than
decreases on switch trials, indicating that repeat trials are
performed as if they were switch trials. However, there is
an alternative interpretation: the task set may be activated
on go and no-go trials alike, but is then suppressed to
inhibit responses on no-go trials (Lenartowicz, Yeung, &
Cohen, 2011; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, &
Vandierendonck, 2005). Consistent with this inhibition
account, switch costs are still observed on trials for which
only the task cue is presented but no target occurs (cue-
only trials; Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Swainson, Martin, &
Prosser, 2016). Thus, one could argue that our participants
did represent their co-actor’s task, but suppressed the rep-
resentation on no-go trials. If so, switch costs could not be
obtained on trials following no-go trials.
While this would be a valid possibility, the inhibition
account faces numerous problems. For one, switch costs
are still eliminated when the previous trial presents a
neutral stimulus that is not assigned to any response (Astle,
Jackson, & Swainson, 2006). No response or task set
should be activated under such conditions, so it would not
be plausible to inhibit one or the other. Also, it has been
shown that switch costs are obtained when one of the
alternative responses is inhibited selectively (Verbruggen,
Leifooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006), suggesting that
inhibition of a given response is not sufficient to inhibit the
entire task set. Most importantly, a task set inhibition
account would have predicted negative switch costs in our
study, because the account predicts that cuing a co-actor to
perform task A in a given no-go trial would lead the actor
to activate and then suppress task set A. This should make
it particularly difficult for the actor to reactivate the just-
suppressed task set A when the task is repeated (Mayr &
Keele, 2000; Meuter, & Allport, 1999), which in turn
should make repeat trials more demanding than switch
trials. Our findings do not provide any support for this
prediction. Thus, we conclude that participants did not
represent anything more complex or comprehensive than
the stimuli that a co-actor is facing and the actions that he
or she performs in a joint condition.
Finally, we should note that previous studies used dif-
ferent variations of joint task switching (Dudarev & Hassin,
2016; Liefooghe, 2016) and demonstrated switch costs after
the co-actor’s trials. These studies used a condition in which
task switching always occurred with switching of the actors,
whereas our method separated the two types of switching. It
would be important for future studies to examine how the
co-occurrences of actor switching and task switching con-
tribute to task-switching costs in joint settings.
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